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ABSTRACT 
The ability to manage and monitor assets provides undeniable benefits in accomplishing 
mission objectives. The value of these capabilities is exponentially greater in disaster 
situations. This thesis introduces the BLOS C2 capability as a method of improving 
disaster response and recovery by enhancing situational awareness (SA) as well as 
command and control (C2). Demonstrated overseas in support of U.S. military 
battlespace coordination, the BLOS C2 capability promotes seamless communication and 
data sharing by means of sensor data and a truly common operational picture. Using the 
proven model that has improved mission effectiveness for the U.S. military, this thesis 
uses the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other levels of government 
involved in emergency response as case studies for analyzing the BLOS C2 capability in 
an effort to fill gaps in interoperability and information sharing. After analyzing each of 
these case studies, the application of the BLOS C2 capability will be considered and 
evaluated for potential benefits. Once these evaluations are made, recommendations will 
be offered that are aimed at implementing the BLOS C2 capability at all levels of 
government. These recommendations will provide DHS with courses of action that could 
enhance SA and C2, and potentially improve response and recovery efforts in the event 
of a disaster. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Since the release of the 9/11 Commission report, the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) has made strides toward the implementation of a nationwide 
interoperable communications network. In doing so, DHS has focused on ensuring 
optimal communications capabilities for the nation’s emergency responders, both in the 
private sector and at every level of government. As the Nationwide Public Safety 
Broadband Network (NPSBN) initiative takes off, the active participation of local and 
state first responder organizations is imperative in successfully deploying an entirely 
interoperable network for effective disaster response and recovery.  
The Joint Battlespace Awareness ISR Integration Capability (JBAIIC), a field 
experimentation initiative at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), specializes in 
ensuring that Intelligence, Surveillance, and/or Reconnaissance (ISR) data is immediately 
available to coalition warfighters to meet mission demands. A wide variety of aerial and 
terrestrial systems are used to acquire and publish ISR data, from hand-held devices to 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and satellites. Through the exploitation of ISR data, 
such as global positioning system (GPS) and full motion video (FMV), over a tactical 
wireless network, JBAIIC can offer enhanced situational awareness (SA) to decision 
makers as well as ground units to improve command and control (C2). Currently, JBAIIC 
is involved in deploying a Beyond Line Of Sight (BLOS) C2 capability for use in the 
battlefield in order to support a battlespace coordination advantage and improved mission 
fulfillment. In achieving this benefit, the BLOS C2 capability promotes seamless 
communication and data sharing by means of sensor data and a common operational 
picture (COP). 
Given the nationwide communications interoperability initiative that DHS is 
emphasizing and JBAIIC’s BLOS C2 expertise, the following research question is raised: 
Could a Beyond Line Of Sight Command and Control capability improve disaster 
response and recovery efforts at the federal, state, and local levels?  
 2
B. IMPORTANCE  
National Emergency Medical Service (EMS) personnel and first responders at all 
levels must have access to reliable and seamless communications in order to effectively 
coordinate response and recovery operations in the event of a disaster. Agencies across 
the U.S. have learned the harsh consequences in failing to establish relationships with 
outside organizations. Events such as the attacks on 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina serve as 
permanent reminders of these very failures. In successfully deploying the DHS-led 
interoperable communications network, integration across first responder organizations 
can theoretically improve the effectiveness of disaster response and recovery. In 
leveraging this initiative, the BLOS C2 capability can contribute to the exploitation of 
relevant SA data through a COP, helping to achieve an enhanced coordination among 
disaster relief efforts. When major emergencies require the aid of federal, state, and local 
organizations, this capability has the potential to aid in the delivery of key resources to 
the right place in a timely manner. The unpredictable nature of disasters has a tendency to 
paralyze the most critical infrastructures at the worst possible time. In a scenario where 
communications represent the lifelines of victims requiring time-sensitive attention, the 
network for carrying out effective disaster response must be resilient and interoperable. 
Once this capability is accomplished, BLOS C2 sensor data such as aerial-provided FMV 
and GPS locating could be shared across the response network. The COP could then 
serve as an interactive community map, allowing users to share relevant information 
about impact areas to respond accordingly. Additionally, with LOS to aerial assets 
carrying radio repeaters, the range of the interoperable emergency communications 
architecture could be extended to support a larger impact area, or a ground LOS-denied 
environment. Due to the potential of benefits offered by the BLOS C2 capability, its 
integration into the nationwide interoperability effort currently being assessed by DHS 
may facilitate enhanced communications and information sharing. When local and state 
organizations begin to comply with the national communications interoperability 
standard, the SA gained through the BLOS C2 capability could significantly improve the 
DHS coordination of cross-agency support of disaster response and recovery.  
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Figure 1.   Example of a Common Operational Picture. (From ESRI Technologies, n.d.) 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Problematic areas raised by the major research question include the financial and 
cultural hurdles involved in the implementation of new communications systems. In 
delivering a nationwide standardization requirement for interoperable radio systems, 
cash-strapped local organizations that rely on larger county communications 
infrastructure could be stranded from the transitioning cooperative efforts, posing 
unforeseeable complications. The financial constraints of underfunded public safety 
agencies could be further aggravated once the majority of agencies have switched over. 
While participating agencies will benefit in the proportional sharing of the new 
communications infrastructure costs, this potentially leaves non-participants with the 
financial burdens of independently managing their own radio communications systems. 
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Non-participation in the interoperable radio system may also be due to cultural 
stubbornness and policy restrictions. What may potentially be found is that organizations 
grounded in traditional operational habits may deny the shift toward technological 
advancements. Additionally, since the implementation of a new communications 
infrastructure requires the backing of multiple members of a jurisdiction, policy 
implementation may encounter differing opinions on relevance and prioritization in the 
best interest of a given community. Familiarization of a new communications system as 
well as the BLOS C2 system may require additional funding for training purposes. While 
initial cost estimates may cover startup expenses, depending on the complexity of a 
system, an extended support contract may be required for continued system utility from 
the vendor. Until an in-house solution is established to support these new systems, this 
may result in additional funding requirements. These potential problematic issues lead me 
to offer the hypothesis that successful implementation of a truly nationwide interoperable 
radio system will require DHS to grant supplemental funding to fiscally strained 
organizations. Another hypothesis drawn from these potential conflicts is that DHS may 
need to exercise mandatory regulation to ensure that all levels of emergency response 
reply to the interoperable communications initiative, which will streamline the desired 
results for improved disaster and response recovery 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Introduction and Problem Statement 
On July 6, 2012, President Barack Obama signed Executive Order (EO) 13618 for 
the “Assignment of National Security and Emergency Preparedness (NS/EP) 
Communications Functions.”1 This EO stressed the need for the federal government to 
provide a resilient communication infrastructure to effectively carry out emergency 
                                                 
1 President Barack Obama, “Executive Order—Assignment of National Security and Emergency 
Preparedness Communications Functions, The White House (July 2012): http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2012/07/06/executive-order-assignment-national-security-and-emergency-preparedness 
(accessed Sept. 12, 2012).  
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response and therefore ensure national security.2 Although this EO was recently signed, it 
is the product of over a decade of planning in fulfilling one of the 9/11 Commission 
recommendations of developing a robust and interoperable Nationwide Public Safety 
Broadband Network (NPSBN).3 The recent actions taken by the White House and  
DHS provide a unique opportunity for evolving technologies to contribute to the use of 
the NPSBN. When coordinated efforts have successfully been implemented at every level 
of public safety, interoperability practices and the sharing of intelligence can improve the 
way disaster response and recovery is carried out. Fortunately, this cooperative initiative 
is making progress; however, until it takes full effect, first responder organizations will 
continue to operate at a major disadvantage. In addressing this problem, analysis  
will be conducted on existing disaster response theory pertaining to inter-agency 
communications. Additionally, in order to summarize where interoperable 
communication efforts are currently headed and how they got there, government 
documentation will be primarily utilized due to its direct relevance and up-to-date 
accounting of program evolution.  
2. Classic Disaster Response Principles–Views on Interoperable 
Communications 
Although the concept of a nationwide effort to combine emergency response 
operations is fairly new at the federal level, the underlying principles of this initiative 
have been around for decades at the lower levels of emergency services. After a series of 
devastating wildfires hit southern California in 1970, Robert Irwin explained that the 
Incident Command System (ICS) was developed to improve emergency response and 
                                                 
2 President Barack Obama, “Executive Order—Assignment of National Security and Emergency 
Preparedness Communications Functions, The White House (July 2012): http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2012/07/06/executive-order-assignment-national-security-and-emergency-preparedness 
(accessed Sept. 12, 2012).  
3 “Written testimony of National Protection and Programs Directorate Office of Cybersecurity and 
Communications Deputy Assistant Secretary Roberta Stempfley for a House Committee on Homeland 
Security, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications hearing titled 
‘Resilient Communications: Current Challenges and Future Advancements,’” U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security (Sept. 2012): http://www.dhs.gov/news/2012/09/12/written-testimony-nppd-house-
homeland-security-subcommittee-cybersecurity-0 (accessed Sept. 13, 2012). 
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coordination efforts when local agency resources were exhausted.4 The planning process 
used in ICS is centered on allowing multiple agencies and emergency response personnel 
the ability to function as one organization to improve effectiveness, accountability and 
communications.5 The commonality quality that ICS is based on first introduced the 
concept of establishing a single communications framework, creating a synergy of shared 
information, coordinated actions, and improved resource utilization.6  An alternate view 
to establishing a single communications framework for emergency management is the 
belief that with a decentralized communication structure, multiple response options 
become available, representing a range of expertise.7 According to risk communications 
expert Peter Sandman, allowing dissent in emergency planning encourages internal 
debate where hard decisions are worked toward, rather than promoting silence and 
complacency from a single coordinative authority in vital planning efforts.8 By 
comparing these theories with relevant communication efforts, capability benefits and 
gaps can be analyzed in addressing the functionality of a nationwide interoperable radio 
network.  
3. ISR Experience in the Battlefield 
The seamless communication efforts that are being ordered by the White House 
and DHS are already being utilized in the battlefield. ISR data collected for mission 
planning is currently capable of being pushed to various coalition forces, allowing 
necessary access to key information.9 Like DHS, the U.S. military puts a priority on 
personnel safety, battlefield SA, and interoperable communications. The much lighter 
                                                 
4 Erik Auf der Heide and Robert Irwin, Disaster Response: Principles of Preparation and Coordination: 
C.V. Mosby Company (1989), 100. 
5 Ibid.  
6 Ibid., 116.  
7 Peter Sandman, “Dilemmas in Emergency Communication Policy,” Emergency Risk 
Communication, Center for Disease Control and Prevention (2003), 19: 
www.psandman.com/articles/dilemmas.pdf (accessed Sept. 19, 2012).  
8 Ibid. 
9 Guy Norris, “Real-Time Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance (ISR) Data Sharing 
Technology for the “Af/Pak” Theatre,” America At War (July 2009): 
http://afpakwar.com/blog/archives/1316 (accessed Apr. 09, 2012).  
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collaborative efforts the U.S. military needs to carry out these priorities are the main 
difference, given the fact that a battlefield is significantly smaller than the entire national 
public safety community. The utility of this common communications network has led to 
the increased use of shared ISR data to combat terrorist organizations. Intelligence is 
defined by the Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage as “the product 
resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation of all 
available information which concerns one or more aspects of foreign nations or of areas 
of operation and which is immediately or potentially significant to planning.”10 Once the 
proper pipe, or network, is provided to the warfighter, it provides the means for accessing 
intelligence to complete critical mission objectives. Although this particular definition of 
intelligence is coined as a military term, the same message applies to public safety 
personnel. Like the warfighter, a first responder can also exploit information in such a 
way that it provides planning relevance through intelligence gathering for disaster 
response strategies. The successes of ISR implementation experienced in the battlefield 
are proving to be effective. White House counterterrorism adviser John O. Brennan 
addressed the nation in April 2012, stating that saving American lives and preventing 
terrorist attacks on the U.S. will require the U.S. to take part in targeted strikes using 
drones.11 This vital counterterrorist tool is made possible through the use of ISR 
strategies and their exploitation over tactical data links, providing mission planning 
advantages and personnel safety. Although one would not initially think that an 
advantage in the U.S. war effort could raise negative attention, ACLU’s Jameel Jaffar is 
an example of someone who is publicly speaking out against the drone program. 
According to Jaffar, President Obama has established a “bureaucratized killing program 
that will be available to every future president against every future enemy.”12 In addition 
                                                 
10 Martin Bimfort, “A Definition of Intelligence,” Central Intelligence Agency, Center for the Study of 
Intelligence (2007): https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-
csi/vol2no4/html/v02i4a08p_0001.htm (accessed Aug. 23, 2012). 
11 Greg Miller, “Brennan speech is first Obama acknowledgement of use of armed drones,” The 
Washington Post (2012): http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national- security/brennan-speech-is-first-
obama-acknowledgement-of-use-of-armed-drones/2012/04/30/gIQAq7B4rT_story.html (accessed Aug. 30, 
2012).  
12 Ari Shapiro, “Are Drones Obama’s Legacy In War On Terrorism?” NPR (June 2012): 
http://www.npr.org/2012/06/20/155389081/are-drones-obamas-legacy-in-war-on-terrorism (accessed Sept. 
19, 2012).  
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to this criticism, drone use has been blamed for excessive collateral damage in carrying 
out targeting attacks, placing a dark cloud over the ISR-driven striking platform that has 
gained the U.S. a comparable edge in the war against terrorism. At the moment, though, 
drones are a leading platform for ISR collection and have already influenced domestic 
law enforcement operations so much that the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) estimates 
that 10,000 drones will be flying domestically by the year 2017.13 Although unmanned 
systems are making progress in successful law enforcement and homeland security 
efforts, the negative attention being attracted in the battlefield may eventually limit their 
implementation domestically.  
4. Emergency Preparedness and Response  
Although internal communication standards are typically enough to conduct 
everyday independent operations, cross-agency communication interoperability is 
essential when a disaster strikes. Hurricane Katrina would come to be known as the most 
destructive natural disaster in U.S. history, claiming $96 billion in total damages and at 
least 1,330 casualties. 14 Adding to the destructiveness of Katrina was the paralyzing of 
communication infrastructures in the incident area. This served as a perfect use case for 
radio interoperability, whose shortcoming during this incident attracted national criticism. 
According to the Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina, “Ineffective communications 
between FEMA [Federal Emergency Management Agency] and other federal 
departments and agencies prevented available federal resources from being effectively 
used for response operations.”15 The lack of communication interoperability resulted in 
missed opportunities to utilize thousands of resources from federal and private agencies.16 
One of few communication successes that FEMA experienced was the use of their 
Mobile Emergency Response Support (MERS) detachments. However, although these 
                                                 
13 Jeff Glor, “Drone use in the U.S. raises privacy concerns,” CBS News (April 2012): 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301–505263_162–57409759/drone-use-in-the-u.s-raises-privacy-concerns/ 
(accessed May 24, 2012).  
14 Executive Office of the President, “Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina,” 8 (Feb. 2006): 
http://www.library.stmarytx.edu/acadlib/edocs/katrinawh.pdf (accessed May, 24 2012). 
15 Ibid., 45.  
16 Ibid. 
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systems successfully provided mobile communications, power generation, and potable 
water, only two of the possible five were used to support the catastrophe.17 The lack of 
accountability in this instance leads to one of the many specific lessons learned expressed 
in “The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina” report, recommending that DHS 
“Establish a National Operations Center to coordinate the National response and provide 
situational awareness and a common operating picture for the entire Federal 
government.”18 BLOS C2 capabilities speak directly to this recommendation, holding 
obvious value in future disaster response and recovery efforts. Another important 
consideration in disaster preparation is the potential for an intentional attack on U.S. 
critical infrastructure. On September 12, 2012, the Committee on Homeland Security’s 
Subcommittee on “Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies” 
held a hearing on the possible threat of an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and its potential 
consequences following the destructive “derecho” that hit Washington, DC, in 2012.19 
Spanish for the word “straight,” a derecho is a term used to describe a widespread, long-
lived, straight-line windstorm that is associated with a fast-moving band of severe 
thunderstorms.20 This unfortunate incident took place on June 29, 2012, claimed the lives 
of 22 victims, and caused widespread damage that left millions of power outages from 
the Midwest to the Mid-Atlantic states.21 This event once again exposed our weak 
emergency communications system and raised concern for future response. Both 
Hurricane Katrina and the Washington, DC, area derecho have subsequently demanded 
                                                 
17 Executive Office of the President, “Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina,.” 8 (Feb. 2006): 
http://www.library.stmarytx.edu/acadlib/edocs/katrinawh.pdf (accessed May, 24 2012), 44.  
18 Executive Office of the President, “Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina,” 8 (Feb. 2006): 
http://www.library.stmarytx.edu/acadlib/edocs/katrinawh.pdf (accessed May, 24 2012), 36. 
19 Dan Lungren, “Subcommittee Hearing: The EMP Threat: Examining the Consequences,” U.S. 
House of Representatives Committee On Homeland Security (Sept. 12, 2012): 
http://homeland.house.gov/hearing/subcommittee-hearing-emp-threat-examining-consequences  (accessed 
Sept. 19. 2012).  
20 AccuWeather, “Intense Storms Called a “Derecho” Slam 700 Miles of the U.S.” (2012): 
http://www.accuweather.com/en/weather-news/deadly-super-derecho-strikes-m/67383 (accessed Sept. 19, 
2012).  
21 Jason Samenow, “Derecho: Behind Washington, D.C.’s destructive thunderstorm outbreak,” June 
29, 2012: http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/capital-weather-gang/post/derecho-behind-washington-
dcs-destructive-thunderstorm-outbreak-june-29–2012/2012/06/30/gJQA22O7DW_blog.html (accessed 
Sept. 19, 2012). 
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attention regarding critical infrastructure protection and national security implications. 
Communications are a vital piece in responding to and recovering from a natural or 
intentional disaster, and U.S. history has provided more than enough material to draw on 
lessons learned and suggestions for future strategies.  
5. Summary 
The BLOS C2 capability is an NPS homegrown system used in JBAIIC 
experimentation for the past five years. Although there is limited literature specifically 
discussing this capability, information provided from the various components that make 
up BLOS C2, such as ISR integration and SA benefits, are used in this thesis. As for now, 
BLOS C2 is a system primarily intended to be used outside of the continental U.S. 
(OCONUS); therefore, examples have yet to be produced for use in the U.S. Through my 
assessment of DHS and local agency desired communication capabilities, I believe that 
the demand and interest in enhanced disaster response and recovery is more than enough 
to justify my major research question.  
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
In approaching my major research question, I used various analytical approaches 
in reaching my conclusions. First and foremost, I used historical analysis to identify gaps 
in disaster response and recovery strategies. In this manner, I assessed the BLOS C2 
capability’s relevance for current homeland security demands. As mentioned in the 
literature review, major disasters in U.S. history, such as Hurricane Katrina and 9/11, 
provide a set of lessons learned that will have a visible effect on response strategy 
objectives. Additionally, historical analysis will reveal capability gaps that might have 
been overlooked in previous disaster response efforts, which can also offer debates used 
to come to a solution. Second, I used case studies to analyze existing disaster response 
strategies at all levels of government, and considered the benefits from integrating BLOS 
C2 capabilities. I initially looked into case studies at the federal level, analyzing the U.S. 
Coast Guard’s communication systems in support of homeland security and disaster 
response. The military’s use of interoperable radios and the ability to pass ISR data to 
ground, air, and sea coalition forces in theater provide an example of the BLOS C2 
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system’s effectiveness in supporting the war effort. These examples are compared to the 
possibility of providing the same data utility at the domestic front. The next case study is 
at the state EMS level. The California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CAL 
FIRE) recently released its 2012 Strategic Plan highlighting the specific goals to promote 
firefighter safety, fireline situational awareness, and early surveillance.22 After studying 
CAL FIRE’s plans for achieving these goals and reviewing their existing 
communications framework, I considered the possible contributions that BLOS C2 can 
offer. The Salinas (California) Police Department (SPD) served as another case study, 
focusing on the local level of government interoperability efforts. Due to the 
department’s recent transition of radio systems to the Harris Unity Next Generation 
(NGEN) P25 infrastructure that promotes interoperability, the BLOS C2 capability may 
also offer solutions in dealing with the city’s growing gang violence issues. Lastly, these 
priorities have the potential to leverage BLOS C2 capabilities in fulfilling improvements 
to disaster response as well as internal operation efficiency. Through the use of these 
research methods, conclusions can be drawn from various aspects of available and 
potential data to address the major research question.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
I first conducted an analysis of the DHS requirement to implement an 
interoperable emergency communication system to be utilized by public safety personnel. 
This required a focus on the federal, state, and local levels of emergency response in 
order to draw on the communications requirements necessary to accomplish the NPSBN 
through policy implementation. This led me into the case study of each level of 
emergency response. After looking at the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), CAL FIRE, and the 
Salinas Police Department, I analyzed each organization’s unique set of requirements in 
order to effectively assess opportunities for improvement and policy implementation 
needed for the integration of the BLOS C2 capability at each level. Once this was 
accomplished, I assessed each agency’s potential to utilize of the BLOS C2 capability in 
                                                 
22 California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection, “2012 Strategic Plan,” 15 (2012): 
http://www.fire.ca.gov/about/downloads/Strategic_Plan/StrategicPlan_SinglePages.pdf (accessed Sept. 20, 
2012). 
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carrying out improved disaster response and recovery. In wrapping up the case studies 
chapter, I drew upon a set of conclusions based on my findings. Drawing on these 
findings, my conclusion offers recommendations to DHS for improving disaster response 
and recovery at the coordinative federal level as well as the state and local levels. In 
closing of my thesis, I also provide future research recommendations as well as a concise 
conclusion summarizing the lessons learned in pursuit of my major research question.  
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II. ANALYSIS OF HOMELAND SECURITY EFFORTS AND 
REQUIREMENTS FOR INTEGRATION OF AN INTEROPERABLE 
EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM 
In order for the BLOS C2 capability to aid in disaster response and recovery, an 
interoperable communications system is required at all levels of government to 
appropriately respond to disasters across the country. DHS has been working on the 
planning and implementation of a nationwide communications effort since 2001; in 2012, 
the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act gave this program a boost by funding 
the Public Safety Communications and Electromagnetic Spectrum Auctions, funding the 
NPSBN.23 This chapter focuses on what DHS has done to facilitate a nationwide 
interoperable emergency communications system, and analyzes whether it is enough to 
support the integration of BLOS C2 capabilities.  
A. DHS OFFICE OF EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS 
Both the 9/11 terrorists attacks and Hurricane Katrina highlighted communication 
shortfalls that resulted in emergency response failures. In response, Congress established 
a DHS Office of Emergency Communications (OEC) in 2007, partnering with all levels 
of government to improve emergency response communications. When President Obama 
updated the NS/EP communications responsibilities with Executive Order 13618, OEC 
and the former DHS National Communications System (NCS) consolidated efforts to 
improve emergency communications programs.24 In an attempt to address all emergency 
communications issues, OEC focuses on supporting interoperable communications with 
existing technical capabilities for a comprehensive NS/EP architecture. Additionally, a 
DHS Emergency Communications Preparedness Center (ECPC) was established in 2009, 
                                                 
23 “Nationwide Public Safety Broadband Network (NPSBN),” Illinois First Net: 
http://www.illinois.gov/firstnet/NPSBN/Pages/default.aspx (accessed Apr. 05, 2013). 
24 “About the Office of Emergency Communications,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 
http://www.dhs.gov/about-office-emergency-communications (accessed Apr. 05, 2013). 
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representing the federal government’s position in coordinating interoperable 
communications across emergency responder jurisdictions and functions.25  
With the expansion of responsibilities given to OEC, a number of branches were 
added to the new division in order to support the coordination of interoperable emergency 
communications at all levels of government. The six branches include: 1) Policy and 
Planning; 2) Partnerships; 3) Regional Coordination; 4) Architecture and Advanced 
Technology; 5) Communications Portfolio Management; and 6) Technical Assistance 
Branches.26 Each branch plays a part in successfully deploying a truly interoperable 
communications effort and making steady progress toward policy guidance and 
implementation.  
 
Figure 2.   Table displaying the formation of OEC by combining EO 13618 and NCS 
Title XVIII efforts. (From DHS/OEC website, June 2012) 
1. Federal Oversight 
Considering the magnitude of the OEC effort, DHS provided a substantial amount 
of support from a national point of view. In particular, the OEC Policy and Planning 
Branch provides policy recommendation and strategies for introducing new 
                                                 
25 “Emergency Communications Preparedness Center,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 
http://www.dhs.gov/emergency-communications-preparedness-center (accessed Apr. 05, 2013). 
26 Ibid. 
 15
communication technologies, while also providing assistance with emergency 
communications grant programs.27 One strategy designed to guide the nation toward a 
standardized emergency communications platform is the National Emergency 
Communications Plan (NECP). This plan outlines specific response-level emergency 
communications goals for emergency responders to work toward, with performance 
metrics designed to evaluate agencies’ interoperability capabilities in disaster situations.28 
The DHS website elaborates on this goal, stating that in order to successfully demonstrate 
response-level communications, “Each area must have common policies and procedures 
that allow interagency communications to occur consistently, clearly-defined responder 
roles and responsibilities that are maintained during an incident, and continuous, high-
quality communications that are in place throughout the emergency or event.”29 With this 
concept in mind, the OEC Architecture and Advanced Technology Branch (AAT) serves 
as the principal emergency communications technical analysis representative, responsible 
for establishing an enterprise architecture as well as developing standards for emerging 
technologies that support emergency communications.30 With standards being set in place 
for many DHS programs, the OEC Communications Portfolio Management Branch 
ensures that national security and emergency preparedness communications goals are the 
main focus. DHS programs such as the Government Emergency Telecommunications 
Service (GETS), Wireless Priority Services (WPS), Telecommunications Service Priority 
(TSP), and Next Generation Network Priority Service (NGN-PS) all serve to provide 
emergency responders with access to priority telecommunications services in order to 
have the appropriate infrastructure for responsive action.31 The OEC Communications 
Portfolio Management Branch oversees these and other programs in order to ensure that 
                                                 
27 “OEC Policy and Planning Branch,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 
http://www.dhs.gov/oec-policy-and-planning-branch (accessed Apr. 06, 2013). 
28 “National Emergency Communications Plan (NECP) Goals,” U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security: http://www.dhs.gov/national-emergency-communications-plan-necp-goals (accessed Apr. 06, 
2013).  
29 Ibid. 
30 “OEC Architecture and Advanced Technology Branch,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 
http://www.dhs.gov/oec-architecture-and-advanced-technology-branch (accessed Apr. 06, 2013). 
31 “OEC Communications Portfolio Management Branch,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 
http://www.dhs.gov/oec-communications-portfolio-management-branch (accessed Apr. 06, 2013).  
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the directives and policies governing these projects are followed. With voice, data, and 
video at the forefront of the BLOC C2 utility, these prioritization programs are ideal in 
emergency situations where critical data will require substantial bandwidth to reach the 
appropriate personnel. These branches are important in establishing an overall 
interoperable communications framework, especially considering the variety of 
government and non-government stakeholders responsible for producing a reliable 
infrastructure and capability.  
2. State and Local Oversight  
With emergency communications stakeholders ranging from international to local 
partners, the OEC Partnerships Branch ensures that consistent emergency response 
improvements are taking place across all levels of government. Specifically, Statewide 
Interoperability Coordinators (SWIC) work to ensure that the Statewide Communications 
Interoperability Plans (SCIP) are being properly implemented in each state, while also 
acting as single points of contact for national interoperable emergency communication 
efforts.32 DHS explains that, “SCIPs should outline and define the current and future 
vision for communications interoperability within the State or territory. In addition, 
SCIPs should align emergency response agencies with the goals, objectives, and 
initiatives for achieving that vision.”33 This formalized governance system helps  
create structures for future technology integration efforts, making up for the lack of 
standardization among two-way Land Mobile Radio (LMR) state emergency response 
users thus far. As of April 2008, all 56 states and territories had a department-approved 
SCIP, which not only encourages feedback, but also provides goals for successfully 
achieving statewide interoperability.34 Understanding that each state faces unique 
challenges in fulfilling communication strategies, OEC also provides annual assessments 
of emergency preparedness communication capabilities and workshops that provide 
hands-on support to tackle state-specific SCIP initiatives. This governance and close 
                                                 
32 “Statewide Interoperability Coordinators,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 
http://www.dhs.gov/statewide-interoperability-coordinators (accessed Apr. 06, 2013). 
33 “Statewide Interoperability Plans,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 
http://www.dhs.gov/statewide-communication-interoperability-plans (accessed Apr. 06, 2013). 
34 Ibid. 
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attention to states provides the oversight required to achieve a true NPSBN, avoiding the 
possibility of states falling behind by ignoring communication gaps.  
Another way that OEC improves multi-jurisdictional and intergovernmental 
communications is through the SAFECOM Program. This program is a collaborative 
effort that draws on the expert opinions of more than 70 members, representing both the 
emergency responder and policy-making communities.35 The SAFECOM program has 
contributed to the creation of guidance documents that have been instrumental in creating 
a clear path toward interoperable emergency communications for agencies at all levels of 
government. Additionally, state and local partners receive focused attention through the 
OEC Regional Coordination Program. This program assigns Regional Coordinators to 
each of the 10 Federal Emergency Management Agency regions, furthering the quality of 
feedback that OEC receives and emphasizing the emergency communications initiative.36 
One way that OEC is building close relationships with states and local entities is through 
their Interoperable Communications Technical Assistance Program (ITAP). Technical 
assistance offered by OEC not only reviews current methods and communication 
technologies, it also provides partners with the opportunity to engage in a number of 
service offerings through their Technical Assistance Catalog. These service offerings 
include workshops that focus on everything from planning to operational transitioning 
and technical development in order to cover all aspects of successfully implementing the 
OEC interoperable communications initiatives.37 In addition to these on-site offerings, 
ITAP also provides partners with interactive online resources that cover a wide range of 
topics regarding the advancement of interoperable emergency communications 
nationwide. The online offerings include useful resources such as project management 
and radio technology training, references to OEC and Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) documentation, and tools that aid in Frequency Mapping and Mobile 
                                                 
35 “SAFECOM Program,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security: http://www.dhs.gov/safecom-
program (accessed Apr. 06, 2013). 
36 “OEC Regional Coordination Program,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 
http://www.dhs.gov/oec-regional-coordination-program (accessed Apr. 06, 2013).  
37 “Office of Emergency Communications Technical Assistance Program,” U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security: http://www.dhs.gov/office-emergency-communications-technical-assistance-program 
(accessed Apr. 06, 2013).  
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Data Surveys, just to name a few.38 Transitioning toward the NPSBN means familiarizing 
state and local responders with the evolving technologies that promote interoperability. 
Through technical assistance and direct interaction with state and local actors, OEC is 




Figure 3.   The interactive OEC Technical Assistance homepage.  
B. FIRSTNET 
Another key contributor in the implementation of the NPSBN is the First 
Responders Network Authority (FirstNet), also funded by the Middle Class Tax Relief 
and Job Creation Act of 2012. Working with OEC, FirstNet in an independent authority 
out of the Department of Commerce’s National Telecommunications and Information 
                                                 
38 “Public Safety Technical Assistance Tools,” Interoperable Communications Technical Assistance 
Program: http://www.publicsafetytools.info/start_index_v2.php (accessed Apr. 06, 2013).  
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Administration (NTIA), and is responsible for rolling out the NPSBN.39 At a minimum, 
DHS explains, “FirstNet is responsible for ensuring nationwide standards for use and 
access of the network; and issuing open, transparent, and competitive requests for 
proposals (RFPs) to build, operate and maintain the network.”40 In order for interoperable 
emergency communications to be readily available during an emergency, a section of the 
radio spectrum is being secured for the NPSBN. This section is known as the “D Block,” 
a 10 Megahertz (MHz) section of the radio spectrum, which will be dedicated to 
providing a network for emergency responders to pass crucial real-time data in the event 
of a disaster.41 Placing the D Block adjacent to the existing 10 MHz section already 
dedicated to public safety (please refer to Figure 4), frees up a total of 20 MHz of radio 
spectrum solely intended for the use of emergency communications.42 
 
 
Figure 4.   Diagram showing the 20 MHz dedicated to public safety and NPSBN in the 
700 MHz frequency band. (Courtesy of Illinois FirstNet. n.d.) 
                                                 
39 Chris Essid, “Nationwide Public Safety Broadband Network,” U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security (June 2012): 
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Fact%20Sheet_Nationwide%20Public%20Safety%20Br
oadband%20Network.pdf (accessed Apr. 07, 2013).  
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 “Nationwide Public Safety Broadband Network (NPSBN),” Illinois First Net: 
http://www.illinois.gov/firstnet/NPSBN/Pages/default.aspx (accessed Apr. 05, 2013). 
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Not only does this landscape provide the capacity to communicate under the 
extreme network traffic environments brought about by emergencies, its location in the 
700 MHz band also plays a major role in its reliability. The FCC elaborates on the 
benefits of the 700 MHz band, explaining, “The location of the 700 MHz Band—just 
above the remaining TV broadcast channels—give it excellent propagation 
characteristics. This allows the 700 MHz signals to penetrate buildings and walls easily 
and to cover larger geographic areas with less infrastructure (relative to frequencies in 
higher bands).”43 These elements are extremely important given the uncertain conditions 
that emergency responders find themselves in once a disaster occurs. With this 
infrastructure in place, the urge for states and local entities to adopt interoperable 
communication systems is clear in order for them to participate in the data exchange. The 
availability and capacity of the NPSBN creates the perfect conditions for BLOS C2 
capabilities to enhance the situational awareness picture that DHS and FirstNet have 
envisioned. 
C. BLOS C2 INTEGRATION  
Prior to researching existing nationwide interoperability efforts, establishing the 
necessary infrastructure to support domestic BLOS C2 capabilities appeared to present a 
number of organizational and financial obstacles. However, after learning about all the 
work over the past 10 years that has contributed to the planning of an interoperable 
emergency communications framework, plus the $7 billion going toward the building of 
the NPSBN, it appears as though BLOS C2 capabilities can leverage DHS’ existing 
progressive efforts.44 With this money going toward the building of the nationwide 
emergency response network and governance structure, BLOS C2 could utilize the 
network to produce a COP populated by sensor data pertaining to an emergency situation. 
Due to the interoperability efforts being implemented across multiple jurisdictions and 
                                                 
43 “700 MHz,” Federal Communications Commission: http://www.fcc.gov/topic/700-mhz (accessed 
Apr. 07, 2013).  
44 “The Nationwide Public Safety Broadband Network: First Steps,” U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security (June 2012): 
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Case%20Study_Broadband%20FirstSteps.pdf (accessed 
Apr. 09, 2013).  
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agencies, useful data from these participants could flow across the network with little to 
no restrictions. The BLOS C2 capability would in turn make this data comprehensive and 
manageable by geo-referencing inputs and providing a level of situational awareness that 
could contribute to the success of emergency response. Although DHS is taking on the 
responsibility of deploying a nationwide emergency communication network, BLOS C2 
would still require some ground-level integration in order to fully operate on the NPSBN 
architecture. This would have to be done once the initial architecture is in place in order 
for the systems to be tested and proven. The NPSBN makes it possible for the emergency 
responder community to benefit from BLOS C2 like the U.S. military has in its overseas 
endeavors. BLOS C2 has proven to be a desired capability for processing the large 
amount of ISR data produced overseas. Without a way to process data and manage assets, 
it is difficult to reap the full potential of their benefit to the mission. To assess the 
contributions that the BLOS C2 capability can offer emergency responders, we must look 
at federal, state, and local case studies to determine the support needed in order to deploy 
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III. CASE STUDIES FOR IMPLEMENTING BLOS C2 
CAPABILITY 
Once a disaster takes place, all levels of government are faced with the demand to 
interact in one way or another. In an effort to analyze the possible effects of BLOS C2 in 
improving disaster relief efforts, it is necessary to focus on individual organizations at the 
federal, state, and local levels in a series of case studies. The agencies that will be 
highlighted are the United States Coast Guard (USCG), CAL FIRE, and the Salinas 
Police Department (SPD). The USCG presents a unique opportunity to bridge gaps 
between domestic and armed forces response efforts given their status as the only 
military organization within DHS. CAL FIRE’s interactions with federal wildland fire 
agencies also presents a number of possible opportunities to improve cooperative efforts 
pertaining to disaster response. Lastly, given the growing concern of gang violence in the 
Salinas Valley of Monterey County, the SPD may be able to benefit from SA capabilities 
in an effort to control limited as well as cooperative assets. These case studies analyze 
each agency’s existing communications infrastructure in order to evaluate the 
requirements needed to implement the BLOS C2 capability. Once this is done, an 
assessment will be made on the potential impact of BLOS C2 on disaster response and 
recovery efforts as they pertain to homeland security. However, before I go into these 
specific case studies, I will explain the components that make up BLOS C2 and lay out 
its structure, functions, and services. 
A. BLOS C2 EXPLAINED 
1. Overview 
Disaster situations create an array of data exchanges between various first 
responder agencies that contribute to time-sensitive relief efforts. Often, however, useful 
data does not make it to the right personnel at the right time, due to communication 
constraints that emerge from technological and physical boundaries. BLOS C2 addresses 
this capability gap through a network architecture that supports bi-directional information 
flows (FMV, still imagery, SA data, and voice and text chat communications) between air 
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and ground assets. This is carried out using various technological and administrative 
components that ensure interoperability among appropriate personnel and organizations. 
The result is an enhanced level of situational awareness (SA) that could aid in emergency 
response efforts.  
 
Figure 5.   BLOS C2 Overview. 
Figure 5 shows the five levels of the BLOS C2 architecture that support the 
operational effectiveness of the capability. Before a network topology can be erected to 
support the BLOS C2 picture, standards are required to govern the participants and 
parameters of the capability. This includes radio spectrum management, network 
protocols, policy, security, and messaging formats that outline the overall architecture of 
the system. These standards are the foundation of an interoperable capability aimed at 
supporting cross agency data exchanges and, once in place, could support specified 
communications platforms responsible for providing the data link for the information to 
pass through.  
These platforms are made up largely of radios, but can also include telephones. 
These radios are the network’s information highway, and promote interoperability 
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through the use of their software-defined digital radio protocols. The LMR technology 
that most agencies still rely on does not support Internet Protocol (IP) networking, 
limiting communications to strictly voice exchanges. In order to support all of the ISR 
information flows that contribute to the enhanced SA picture, high bandwidth, bi-
directional, and IP capable network radios are required to push and pull the different 
types of data available. This capability is currently supported on the battlefield by U.S. 
forces through the use of Tactical Waveform IP radios. The implementation of P25 radios 
accomplishes the same objective domestically through a suite of standards for digital 
radio communications that enable federal, state, and local agencies to communicate with 
other agencies during emergency response efforts. The Ethernet interface on these IP 
radios allow users to connect their computer to the radio in order to use the data link to 
pass information such as video, SA tracks, and chat communications.  
With respect to services that reside on the network, BLOS C2 incorporates 
terrestrially based servers for FMV and imagery processing, as well as a messaging 
infrastructure for event tagging and filtering. These servers interface with enterprise data 
sources (e.g., Automatic Identification System, Marine Transportation System) that 
provide a layer of information that can be used to enhance the SA picture. Additionally, 
the servers provide processing functionality with the ability to store large amounts of 
data, providing unique capabilities and services for network participants to utilize.  
In order to access and pass information across these services and the network, 
BLOS C2 incorporates a software application suite that supports the C2 functionality and 
needs of the personnel responding to an emergency. These software applications include 
mapping, chat clients, voice clients, video players, Cursor on Target (CoT) tracking, as 
well as standard Windows applications. With the use of IP network-capable radios and 
the proper network configuration, users can connect their computers via a wireless or 
Ethernet interface to an IP radio and use the BLOS C2 software suite to exchange 
relevant data pertaining to an emergency over the BLOS C2 network. As an example, 
Figures 7 and 8 show the list of Windows applications that warfighters are currently 
using to pass critical information in the battlefield.  
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The last level that makes up the BLOS C2 infrastructure is the actual sensor data. 
These include enterprise data, FMV from aerial and ground Electro-Optical/Infrared 
(EO/IR) cameras, real-time positions of friendly and enemy locations, position of assets 
and critical infrastructure, and other relevant information that might be gathered. The 
sensor data is what makes the BLOS C2 capability really worthwhile, pushing the limits 
of traditional radio communications and providing useful data to the right personnel at 
the right time. The end result is an interoperable solution for communicating and 
displaying SA data along with real-time video and communications, enhancing the 
responder’s awareness of the incident environment.  
 
Figure 6.   Components of a Common Operational Picture. 
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Figure 7.   BLOS C2 Software/Application List. 
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Figure 8.   BLOS C2 Software/ Application List (continued). 
One of the main benefits that BLOS C2 contributes is the integration of a COP 
that can be shared across the network with appropriate personnel. As seen in Figure 6, the 
COP is made up of five functional areas that contribute to the SA gained from the overall 
picture. These functional areas are addressed by the five BLOS C2 architecture levels, 
providing the structure for an effective crisis-control solution. As previously noted, the 
ISR technologies that make up the BLOS C2 capability are currently fielded in theater 
and provide critical C2 that improves mission effectiveness. Through the use of ISR 
sensors that are populated into a COP, warfighters are currently able to visually track 
assets and subscribe to aerial FMV with the use of IP radios and strict process 
management practices. The interoperability gained through this system provides a 
common sharing platform that utilizes data being gathered from various agencies. After 
looking at case studies at the federal, state, and local government levels, this chapter 
examines the potential advantages of BLOS C2 capabilities could provide to improve 
emergency response and recovery at specific levels of government.  
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Figure 9.   Screenshot of a user’s computer screen with BLOS C2 capabilities. 
B. U.S. COAST GUARD 
Attaining and sustaining an effective understanding and awareness of the 
maritime domain requires the collection, fusion, analysis, and 
dissemination of prioritized categories of data, information, and 
intelligence… Defeating terrorism requires integrated, comprehensive 
operations that maximize effectiveness without duplicating efforts.45 
USCG Office of Counterterrorism & Defense Operations Policy 
1. Overview and Requirements 
The United States Coast Guard (USCG) was placed under the DHS as a result of 
the Homeland Security Act of 2002.46 Since the foundation of the agency, the USCG has 
focused most of its attention on defending the U.S. maritime environment as well as 
responding to those in peril. Given the broad geographic conditions facing the USCG, 
                                                 
45 “Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security (PWCS),” United States Coast Guard (2013): 
http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg532/pwcs.asp (accessed Apr. 11, 2013).  
46 107th Congress, “An Act to establish the Department of Homeland Security, and for other 
purposes,” Public Law 107–296-NOV. 25, 2002: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hr_5005_enr.pdf 
(accessed Apr. 11, 2013).  
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continuous developments are always being made in strengthening its ability to detect and 
identify all activities in the maritime domain. This capability is known as Maritime 
Domain Awareness (MDA) and is a vital interest in safeguarding the homeland.47 With 
this interest in mind, the USCG made strides toward updating boats and cutters (a vessel 
65 feet in length or greater with live-aboard crew accommodations) to improve 
communications and implement emerging technologies. The Integrated Coast Guard 
Systems (ICGS) is focused on accomplishing these improvements by introducing three 
classes of new cutters and small boats, as well as manned and unmanned aircraft.48 As an 
added benefit, the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) will be both land-based and cutter-
based, increasing aircraft availability and data production. Additionally, the USCG 
assures that, “All of these highly capable assets are linked with Command, Control, 
Communications and Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) 
systems, and are supported by an integrated logistics regime.”49 These systems make for 
ideal BLOS C2 participants and make integration a matter of minor software 
configuration. Without the improvements being made by the ICGS initiative, USCG 
vessels would have limited mission effectiveness, especially in joint efforts. The USCG is 
also a big proponent of COP capabilities. The USCG has a program dedicated to 
developing a Common Operational Picture (COP), aiming to increase the amount of 
information available, as well as adding users and improving access methods.50 With 
access to databases such as the Nationwide Automatic Identification System (NAIS) and 
the Long Range Identification and Tracking System (LRIT) used for vessel tracking, a 
COP can provide the USCG with a shared display of data capable of improving command 
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and control capabilities.51 The U.S. military has a variety of data injections that could be 
used to populate the COP, which in addition to geographic locations can include 
information related to assets, activities, planning, environmental conditions, and ISR 
data. Additionally, with the EO/IR video sourcing from on-board UAVs, video can be 
shared with COP participants as long as the network is capable of handling the data 
packets. With the USCG taking the initiative in developing COP capabilities, BLOS C2 
becomes another useful source of data in achieving mission objectives. To this end, once 
vessels receive the appropriate C4ISR interoperability upgrades, BLOS C2 should be able 
to contribute to the data being processed into the COP without requiring any major 
system changes.  
2. Assessment 
After taking a look at the USCG’s existing communications infrastructure, it 
seems as though BLOS C2 capabilities can provide an added benefit in achieving the 
branch’s core goals without making very many changes to the existing structure. One of 
the USCG’s primary responsibilities is Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security (PWCS), 
and due to the importance that this mission has for homeland security, I use the 
highlighted mission to assess BLOS C2’s operational impact. According to the USCG 
website, “The PWCS mission entails the protection of the U.S. Maritime Domain and the 
U.S. Marine Transportation System (MTS) and those who live, work or recreate near 
them; the prevention and disruption of terrorist attacks, sabotage, espionage, or 
subversive acts; and response to and recovery from those that do occur.”52 In meeting 
these goals, the PWCS mission must carefully utilize USCG assets in order to completely 
achieve MDA on our waters. The MTS plays a vital role in maintaining the nation’s 
economic health, supporting 99% of U.S. overseas trade and plays a critical role in 
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military mobilization.53 Conducting PWCS creates preventative measures against 
terrorists who might target the MTS in an effort to damage a piece of our nation’s critical 
infrastructure. In achieving MDA to protect the this critical infrastructure, BLOS C2 
capabilities can not only aid in the consolidation of intelligence, but also expedite 
recovery efforts in the event of an attack.  
The USCG relies on three primary methods of communicating between vessels 
and shore stations. These methods include Very High Frequency (VHF) Marine band 
radio, Medium Frequency/ High Frequency (MF/HF) Radiotelephone, and Mobile 
satellite radios.54 VHF radios are the most relied upon communication method, intended 
for use between 5 to 10 miles of other vessels, and at least 20 miles to USCG shore 
stations.55 VHF radios are also how the USCG receives distress calls from commercial 
and private vessels, and act as a party line allowing all channel participants to listen in on 
radio traffic.56 In order to communicate at longer distances above 20 miles to several 
hundred miles, MF/HF radios are needed, requiring ideal antenna placement and 
substantial transmission power. This longer-range solution is useful for voice 
communications when VHF radios can no longer maintain a reliable link; however, its 
limited bandwidth does not substantially support other data formats such as video and 
still images. With the newer technology added to USCG cutters, the information being 
generated off shore could offer advantages to other users. Through the implementation of 
BLOS C2, the higher bandwidth VHF radio communications can sustain longer range 
while injecting the cutter sensor data into the overall USCG COP. This capability could 
potentially provide a layer of security and preparedness in the event of a MTS attack. 
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The Mumbai, India, attacks carried out in 2008 by Pakistani terrorists accounted 
for approximately 160 deaths, and more than 308 injured.57 In the aftermath of the 
attacks, it was reported that the terrorists inserted themselves into the country via small 
rubber boats, equipped with heavy backpacks that contained their weapons.58 Although 
friendly countries border the U.S., this scenario is plausible and has been a DHS concern 
due to the difficulty to reliably detect this method of insertion along our vast coastlines. 
This tragic event highlights the need for enhanced MDA, especially considering the 
implications that this attack has on human life and the security of our ports and 
waterways. The BLOS C2 capability could aid in achieving MDA through prevention 
and response. 
Although the USCG practices the screening of vessels and crews, random 
boardings, and increased patrols of critical infrastructure, an operational need for 
enhanced SA exists. Under the ICGS initiative discussed earlier in this case study, it is 
reported that the UAVs will be added to the USCG’s assets. These UAVs will obviously 
be able to aid in the increased patrolling of critical infrastructure, but they will also offer 
the capability of detecting suspicious activity with ample time to allow a boarding before 
a docking can take place. Supported with C4ISR interoperable systems, these UAVs will 
be equipped with the necessary tools to produce valuable data for MDA. BLOS C2 could 
help in the application of this data by providing the utility of video distribution and 
storage. With FMV originating from a cutter or shore-based UAV, agencies outside of 
the USCG will want to access the captured information. Through a computer networking 
process known as multicast, BLOS C2 can deliver the UAV FMV to a group of approved 
destination computers simultaneously in a single transmission. This capability improves 
fusion efforts that promote information sharing, which is a top DHS priority since the 
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release of the 9/11 commission report.59 This means that, in the process of conducting 
routine UAV patrols of a given area, the appropriate agencies have the opportunity to 
compare and provide additional information that may have not been considered by the 
originating agency. Tips and communication interceptions are not always broadcasted for 
all agencies to weigh in on, creating gaps in intelligence gathering that can allow attacks 
to be carried out under the radar. Through the multicasting of USCG drone video, these 
types of gaps are constricted, allowing for more opportunities to prevent malicious 
activities such as an attack on the MTS. Additionally, BLOS C2 offers the capability of 
storing FMV in large capacities. This not only helps with performing after action analysis 
of captured events, but it also aids in the ability to compare and detect behaviors that take 
place over long periods of time. In addition to these preventative measures, the BLOS C2 
capability can also aid in response efforts using this same scenario.  
In the event that a disaster would occur on a MTS component, USCG response 
efforts could be improved with the implementation of BLOS C2 in the existing ICGS 
upgrade plan. Although the USCG already has a COP program used to create SA, BLOS 
C2 could collaborate data inputs outside of USCG in order to enhance the SA picture. 
With contributions from joint agencies in response to a disaster, response strategies can 
be managed properly by avoiding the duplication of efforts from multiple organizations. 
This is especially important when resources are limited and attention is required on 
multiple fronts. With the MTS being considered as critical infrastructure, it is imperative 
that disaster response be performed in the most efficient manner possible. BLOS C2 not 
only proposes efficiency in managing the data populating the COP, it also promotes the 
efficient management of collaborative assets and efforts in the event of a disaster. Figure 
10 represents the current USCG communications capability, while Figure 11 displays a 
broad overview of how BLOS C2 could improve USCG communication and data sharing 
in the scenarios presented in this case study. 
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Figure 10.    USCG/ ICGS communications overview and without BLOS C2 implemented.  
 
 
Figure 11.   USCG communications overview using BLOS C2. 
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Although the two figures have the same nodes present, the information routes and 
distribution of data is different. As can be seen in Figure 10, the UAV is gathering FMV 
data; however, it is only able to share the information with the cutter from which it 
launched. This excludes the command post and emergency responders on the ground 
from accessing the data, because the processing capability (BLOS C2) is not present. 
Additionally, SA data is limited to the USCG COP in the existing communications 
framework as seen in Figure 10. However, once BLOS C2 technologies are implemented, 
as shown in Figure 11, the COP is extended to all ground users within USCG as well as 
cooperative agencies. Even though all of the nodes can maintain voice communications 
in the current architecture, FMV viewing can offer substantial benefits for all supporting 
agencies. Once the BLOS C2 capability is introduced into the architecture, multiple users 
can then view the FMV from the cutter UAV through the BLOS C2 enabled link 
supported by the NPSBN and NGEN radios. Accurate positioning of each node is 
provided by real-time GPS tracking, which can be seen in both figures, validating the 
information that is being displayed in the COP. The USCG is on an aggressive path 
toward interoperability and MDA with the use of COPs and upgraded assets; however, 
through the use of BLOS C2, their current efforts could achieve greater mission 
effectiveness as seen in this case study.  
C. CAL FIRE 
In a state as large and populated as California, cooperative efforts via 
contracts and agreements between state, federal, and local agencies are 
essential to respond to emergencies like wildland and structure fires, 
floods, earthquakes… and even terrorist attacks. Because of these types of 
cooperative efforts fire engines and crews from many different agencies 
may respond at the scene of an emergency. California Department of 
Forestry and Fire Protection, “What is CAL FIRE?”60 
1. Overview and Requirements 
The California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection’s (CAL FIRE) mission 
statement is, “to serve and safeguard people by protecting California’s property and 
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resources from fire.” Serving 35 of California’s 58 counties, CAL FIRE faces ongoing 
challenges due to unpredictable environmental conditions and a growing population.61 On 
average, CAL FIRE reportedly “responds to more than 5,600 wildland fires that burn 
over 172,000 acres each year. In addition, department personnel answer the call more 
than 350,000 times for other emergencies including structure fires; automobile accidents; 
medical aids; swift water rescues; civil disturbances; search and rescues; hazardous 
material spills; train wrecks; floods; and earthquakes.”62 The workload taken on by CAL 
FIRE has contributed to its positive reputation and dependability, giving the department 
the opportunity to assist in response efforts with federal and local agencies. Not only is 
this collaboration useful in creating cross-agency partnerships, it is also absolutely 
necessary in order to appropriately respond to national disasters. With the level of 
cooperativeness that CAL FIRE has adopted, it is without a doubt that their services 
would be summonsed and necessary in the event of a terrorist attack in or around the state 
of California. Currently, CAL FIRE’s rapid response solution for establishing 
communication capabilities on the move is through their Mobile Communications 
Centers (MCC). The MCC provides a mobile hub for communications activity and allows 
dispatchers to monitor the incident radio traffic on site and coordinate with local 
Emergency Command Centers (ECC).63 The communications equipment provided on the 
MCC include: 10 channel dispatch consoles with VHF, UHF, Low Band, 800 MHz, and 
VHF-AM radios, Satellite telephones, an amateur (HAM) radio station, and a 30-foot 
pneumatic antenna mast that can be seen in Figure 12.64  This equipment is provided in a 
mobile platform in order to respond to disasters in remote areas, relying on satellite 
connectivity to pass voice communications when the other tower-dependent radios are 
out of reach. In addition to the 5 MCCs currently in service, CAL FIRE also operates 
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over 1,000 fire engines, 63 paramedic units, 215 rescue squads, 11 helicopters, and 13 air 
tactical planes among other support equipment. 65 With the entire state of California to 
serve, CAL FIRE demands the efficient distribution of this equipment in order to 
effectively carry out its protective initiatives. 
 
 
Figure 12.   CAL FIRE MCC (Images retrieved from CAL FIRE website). April 2011. 
In 2012, CAL FIRE released its Strategic Plan highlighting the specific goals 
required to improve the department’s performance amidst changes in fire protection 
demands and technological advancements.66 The initiatives listed throughout this 
strategic plan are in response to mandates that call for improved management of 
monetary and personnel resources while maintaining the overall success and efficiency of 
the organization. One suggestion provided in the Strategic Plan that specifically speaks to 
the integration of the BLOS C2 capability is the objective to utilize evolving technologies 
to benefit the following fire protection priorities: “firefighter health and safety, fireline 
situational awareness and status (including Automated Vehicle Location (AVL) 
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technology and supporting software/hardware), and early surveillance (e.g., aerial 
cameras and drones with thermal imaging and store and record capabilities).”67 Intended 
to take the department through the year 2017, CAL FIRE’s Strategic Plan in conjunction 
with the NPSBN could offer an ideal environment for BLOS C2 integration. Once 
integrated into a support unit such as a MCC, BLOS C2 could aid the dispatch role by 
improving radio reliability along with the benefits of a Common Operating Picture 
(COP). With these benefits taking effect, CAL FIRE could increase interoperability with 
cooperative agencies and operate more efficiently in remote areas, improving response 
tactics used to support disasters that could threaten homeland security.  
2. Assessment 
As mentioned in the overview, CAL FIRE’s response to more than 5,600 wildland 
fires every year demand the need of a plan to efficiently manage their distributed 
equipment and a staff of 4,700 full-time fire professionals.68  To accomplish this, the 
2012 Strategic Plan paves the way for the identification of technologies related to 
fulfilling fire protection priorities. Serving over 31 million acres, the need to coordinate 
assets and operations is vital in carrying out the CAL FIRE mission and ensuring 
firefighter safety.69 CAL FIRE could improve coordination efforts with a BLOS C2 
capability through the use of a COP populated by various relevant data sources such as 
real-time video and GPS tracking provided by the AVL technology. With the distribution 
of a COP across the department and cooperative agencies, tracking and requesting 
additional resources and personnel becomes easier to manage. The C2 gained from this 
SA picture could vastly improve not only firefighter safety, but fireline SA as well. The 
nature of wildfires and their geographic hurdles can make this task especially difficult for 
tower dependent/line of sight communications. Through the utilization of interoperable 
radios such as P25 NGEN radios with trunking and GPS capabilities, user location is 
provided to all subscribers on a specified channel over the secure network. Additionally, 
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LOS communications can be extended through the use of radio access points onboard 
CAL FIRE aerial assets. This would provide critical range extension for communications 
in areas with geological boundaries that prevent users from establishing a reliable link. 
Physical boundaries can become less of an inhibitor in carrying out C2 communications 
once this capability becomes available, allowing for the accountability of personnel in 
nearly any environment. Finally, with access to aerial sources of video such as thermal 
imaging, early detection and fireline status can be delivered to firefighters and first 
responders in less time, minimizing total loss of fire destruction.  
To understand how BLOS C2 capabilities can directly improve CAL FIRE’s 
emergency response plan, I will be applying the benefits to a scenario that would call on 
CAL FIRE to work cooperatively with other agencies to showcase the potential of the 
capability. With a terrorist’s primary objective revolving around the notion of creating 
widespread fear, it would not be unrealistic to assume that state and national forests 
would be potential targets. Whether a wildfire was a terrorist’s primary objective or a 
result of a bombing, CAL FIRE would be required to respond in the same manner. As 
with any forest fire, detection is a vital component in assessing and responding to the 
incident. Equipped with existing EO/IR cameras, CAL FIRE aerial assets could properly 
diagnose fire severity as well as response requirements from that vantage point. This is an 
existing capability; however, BLOS C2 could provide secure multicast capabilities to 
ground users just as it would in the USCG model, keeping approved personnel in the loop 
and denying access to all others. Figure 8 demonstrates how the video is tunneled directly 
back to the dispatch center in the current framework, while Figure 14 displays the ability 
to publish the useful video to ground subscribers with the implementation of BLOS C2 
capabilities. Video SA would allow CAL FIRE and cooperative departments, ranging 
from federal and local branches, to further engage in the overall response effort. 
Additionally, if terrain is a limiting factor in passing reliable voice communications and 
other sources of data such as FMV, BLOS C2 assets could extend the range of 
communication through the use of repeaters on CAL FIRE aerial assets (refer to Figure 
14). This solution is reconfigurable due to the mobility of the aircraft and also much more 
reliable than satellite communications that only support low bandwidth data exchange. 
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Lastly, with the threat of terrorist involvement, a COP can assist in providing a map of 
where EMS personnel and equipment are located, as well as references of where potential 
terrorists or “red forces” are thought to be located. Without the presence of BLOS C2 
systems, a COP is not supported in CAL FIRE’s communication architecture. However, 
as seen in Figure 14, once implemented, COP SA data could cover the entire incident 
area. GPS-enabled radios and CAL FIRE AVL technology provide the availability of 
these data injections, in addition to user inputs that share information regarding other 
useful elements such as environmental hazards. Currently, geographical boundaries place 
limitations on emergency responder line of sight (LOS) land mobile radio 
communications due to their tower dependency. Although Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and 
satellite phones provide worldwide coverage for the most part, this method of 
communication is limited to primarily voice communications, ruling out their use in 
architectures that require larger data exchanges. Figure 13 depicts this dilemma by 
showing how supporting agencies may be denied communications with other departments 
responding to the same incident due to LOS-deprived environments. The NPSBN would 
ensure that supporting departments could seamlessly participate in mission 
communications and also provide COP capabilities far beyond CAL FIRE’s sole 
visibility. This would provide cooperative agencies with the necessary tools to join and 
assist in disaster response efforts under the condition that they comply with the 
interoperability standards set in place by DHS. With terrorist organizations exploring 
potential U.S. targets, it is fair to say that BLOS C2 could potentially limit the damage 




Figure 13.   CAL FIRE Communications Overview with Existing Architecture. 
 
 
Figure 14.   CAL FIRE Communications Overview with BLOS C2 Integrated 
Capabilities. 
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While the NGEN communications capabilities cover statewide firefighting 
efforts, they will also potentially satisfy national DHS initiatives. In adopting NGEN P25 
radios, CAL FIRE can benefit from BLOS C2 capabilities while moving in the direction 
of complying with the DHS-mandated nationwide public safety broadband network 
initiative (NPSBN). When communications are denied due to a disaster, inter-agency 
cooperation and network deployment become the highest priorities in coordinating large-
scale emergency responses. This is especially true if terrorist actions are involved, 
making recovery efforts time sensitive. With the implementation of the NPSBN, BLOS 
C2 can potentially bridge relevant first responders under one network, while publishing 
critical data that can lead to more efficient response and recovery. This capability speaks 
directly to the requirements described in the 2012 CAL FIRE Strategic Plan as well as the 
Department of Homeland Security NPSBN initiative, and can offer advantages that have 
been tested and experienced by U.S. military in the battlefield.  
D. SALINAS POLICE DEPARTMENT 
Working in partnership with the people of Salinas to enhance the quality 
of life through the delivery of professional, superior and compassionate 
police services to the community.  
—Salinas Police Department Mission Statement 
1. Overview and Requirements 
Responsible for over half of the lettuce grown in the U.S., the city known as the 
“Salad Bowl” has received national attention for more than just lettuce production over 
the years.70 In 2009, the city of Salinas reportedly had a homicide rate that was four times 
that of the national average, accounting for 29 murders by the end of the year.71 The 
growing gang influence in Salinas is completely responsible for these figures, placing 
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local law enforcement at the center of the problem. Taken from its website, “The Salinas 
Police Department (SPD) has a staff of 149 sworn and 58 non-sworn personnel, an 
authorized sworn strength of 187 police officers, and an annual budget of $18 million.” 72 
SPD’s manning took a hit in 2010 when the city of Salinas faced a budget crisis, forcing 
the chief of police to cut 19 sworn officer position as well as seven staff members.73 This 
reduction of police workforce only added to the city’s crime issues, deploying fewer 
patrol officers while the gang community continued to grow. To provide an idea of what 
the department is up against, SPD responds to an average of 8,500 calls for service each 
month, to a community of over 160,000 residents.74 These numbers contribute to the 
raised awareness of SPD’s understaffing issues, becoming a cause for concern in the 
“Salinas Comprehensive Strategy for Community-wide Violence Reduction,” released in 
2010. This strategic plan pointed out that in 2008, the city of Salinas was listed as having 
1.23 full-time police officers per 1,000 residents compared to the California average of 
2.56 officers per 1,000.75 Additionally, crime data collected by the Federal Bureau of 
Intelligence (FBI) indicates that Salinas’ violent crime rates are among the nation’s 
highest, occurring at the frequency of 7.3 per 1,000 residents compared to the national 
average of 3.9 per 1,000.76 The result of these statistics leads to the realization that the 
city’s considerably high crime rates are simply too demanding for the short-handed SPD. 
In conducting day-to-day police operations, officers are supported with standard 
technical policing devices that aid in communications and surveillance to a certain 
degree. During a typical shift, an officer utilizes the following technological equipment: a 
vehicle-mounted mobile data terminal (MDT), a vehicle mounted/ portable land mobile 
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radio (LMR), and cellular phones.77 Other assets that officers have limited access to are 
five Closed Circuit TVs (CCTV) and a Mobile Command Vehicle (MCV). The five 
CCTVs are closed circuit mobile cameras that conduct surveillance on known 
problematic areas. Although the CCTVs have the potential to improve response efforts, 
their main purpose is to extend police presence without physically locating an actual 
police officer at the site. The MCV was initially intended to support high-risk events that 
required advanced command and control (C2); however, the lack of computing and 
communications equipment has stripped the response vehicle of its operational value.  
In order to comply with the larger DHS efforts to implement the NPSBN and 
offer the ability to integrate BLOS C2 technologies, SPD would need to vastly improve 
its communications infrastructure as well as more fully utilize existing assets that could 
offer benefits in carrying out police efforts. Some of these requirements have already 
been initiated with the help of grants from state and federal entities including the U.S. 
Department of Justice and DHS.78 The capabilities that are being pursued due to 
availability of grant funding include the procurement of 200 portable and 70 handheld 
vehicle-mounted broadband NGEN radios and the outfitting of patrol vehicles with 3G 
wireless Internet connectivity for MDT implementation.79 Although these improvements 
affect SPD’s ability to move forward with NPSBN initiatives, the integration of these 
new technologies need to stretch beyond satisfying DHS communications standards in 
order to help respond to the demands of the severe gang problem facing the city.  
2. Assessment 
In addition to efforts revolving around community involvement and local 
response strategies, SPD has openly requested assistance from allied agencies in response 
to dramatic spikes in violence. In 2013, SPD issued a request for help in carrying out a 
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“City Wide Directed Enforcement” that would target gangs and their members who were 
known to have been involved in criminal activity.80 In response, on August 2, 2013,  
70 officers participated in the operation, representing state and federal law enforcement 
agencies such as Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms, Federal Bureau of Investigations, 
Homeland Security Investigations, United States Marshall’s Office, and California 
Highway Patrol.81 The cooperation of these agencies was crucial in successfully carrying 
out the operation that would ultimately result in the arrests of 10 known gang members 
while conducting 10 residential searches, over 70 traffic stops, and numerous pedestrian 
checks.82 The success of this effort highlights the need to continue with the 
implementation of NPSBN interoperable communication standards at the local level. 
Additionally, this operative further highlights DHS’ recognition that the presence of gang 
activity in Salinas presents a significant threat to public safety that requires attention. 
With ongoing assistance taking place in Salinas from allied law enforcement agencies, 
the use of BLOS C2 capabilities could enhance the cooperative efforts aimed at reducing 
gang activity.  
In displaying the effects of BLOS C2 capabilities in the city of Salinas, a scenario 
similar to that of the City Wide Directed Enforcement operation will be used to analyze 
the potential benefits. This scenario serves to accurately represent SPD’s operational state 
when local resources are exhausted. This can be due to either a large-scale cooperative 
effort such as the directed enforcement operation, or from an unforeseen disaster 
requiring outside assistance. As of yet, video sourced by the CCTV is only accessible by 
the watch commander who is occupied with a number of responsibilities. This causes the 
CCTVs to act as only deterrents, failing to process the information being captured by the 
five distributed cameras. Additionally, the MCV is virtually useless at the moment, 
lacking the computing and communication equipment to actively participate in command 
and control of an incident. As for the department’s current interoperability efforts, the 
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200 P25 broadband radios procured via federal grants will contribute to NPSBN 
compliance and will provide the framework for BLOS C2 development. However, until 
NPSBN is fully deployed and these types of radios are issued nationwide, it will be 
difficult to seamlessly support cross-agency police/relief efforts. Figure 15 displays the 
current framework just described, showing how the architecture is enough to conduct 
day-to-day police work. Although this indicates that SPD is not fully utilizing department 
assets, BLOS C2 implementation could help integrate these components into the broad 
policing and response strategy. 
 
Figure 15.   Existing SPD Communications Framework Overview. 
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Figure 16.   SPD Communications Framework with BLOS C2 Integration. 
SPD’s limited personnel resources make it imperative that asset control be carried 
out in day-to-day and emergency operations. SPD is another example of how a Common 
Operational Picture (COP) can help ensure personnel safety as well as the situational 
awareness (SA) of an environment. Up until SPD received the P25 radios, police officers 
were expected to verbally communicate their positions when dismounting from their 
patrol vehicles. This puts the officer in a vulnerable situation given the variety of ways in 
which an officer is incapable of operating his/her radio. The P25 radios recently acquired 
are all GPS enabled, providing real-time location data of every officer’s whereabouts. 
These radios are also interoperable and software defined, meaning upgrades are 
performed by updating software rather than replacing the device altogether. Between the 
interoperability of the P25 radios and the NPSBN, additional assets from outside 
organizations have the capability to offer assistance without coming across frequency 
issues that could terminate communication links. The positioning data provided by these 
radios is also valuable for COP development, allowing watch commanders to monitor 
officer dismounts as well as manage assets during major incidents. With the COP 
distributed across the network, officers and allied partners can receive information 
regarding the whereabouts of suspected criminals, updated perimeter information, as well 
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as other data map layers that could give officers the upper hand. Figure 16 demonstrates 
this point, showing the possibility of sustaining a COP where one was not available in 
Figure 15 in the current SPD framework. Another big difference between the existing 
framework and the BLOS C2 enabled architecture is the distribution of CCTV video. 
Video multicasting can make CCTV cameras more than mere deterrents, allowing 
network users the opportunity to open video streams and monitor activities remotely. 
Lastly, by upgrading the MCV with BLOS C2 systems, the vehicle could be deployed 
during incidents such as disasters where close communications monitoring may be 
required due to network saturation. This would add to SPD’s available incident response 
capabilities, while providing another layer of command and control. 
All three case studies presented different scenarios in which BLOS C2 could 
leverage existing efforts to enhance disaster response and recovery capabilities. Each 
agency is at a different stage of development, all requiring some level of action in order 
to take full advantage of BLOS C2 and the coming nationwide emergency responder 
communications initiative. With these case studies in mind, in the next chapter, I suggest 
policy recommendations that will have the most impact on improving disaster response 
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BLOS C2 IMPLEMENTATION 
AND INTEGRATION 
Upon my initial assessment of existing DHS-led interoperability initiatives aimed 
at improving disaster response and recovery, the amount of emphasis placed on updating 
communications infrastructure was unclear. However, after learning about the progress 
that DHS has made through the NPSBN program, it is evident that providing an 
interoperable network to support disaster efforts is a high priority. The NPSBN is focused 
on providing a secure, reliable, and dedicated interoperable network for public service 
personnel to communicate in the event of an emergency. This initiative presents an 
opportunity for the BLOS C2 capability to provide network content and services to 
enhance the SA and C2 of an incident area. The implementation of this updated 
communications infrastructure requires the use of appropriate equipment and applications 
in order to establish network connectivity and participate in data exchanges. This implies 
the use of IP capable network devices and software applications intended specifically for 
the utilization of net-centric data and services. Additionally, the interoperability gained 
through the implementation of a nationwide broadband network creates an incentive to 
integrate DHS COPs with other public service mapping displays. Through the NPSBN, 
DHS has presented a progressive path toward interoperable communications and 
information sharing. Through the utilization of BLOS C2 network capabilities, DHS 
could build on the promising benefits that will be offered by the NPSBN. After 
evaluating the case study assessments that were offered in the previous chapter, the 
following recommendations will offer various possible courses of action for the 
implementation of the BLOS C2 capability. These recommendations are suggested in an 
effort to promote interoperability and information sharing across all levels of 
government, and ultimately improve disaster response and recovery efforts. 
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A. RECOMMENDATION #1—DHS SHOULD ENSURE THAT FUTURE 
ACQUISITIONS OF COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT BE IP 
NETWORK CAPABLE 
The first course of action that emerges from the findings of this thesis for DHS to 
secure a foundation for BLOS C2 integration is the assurance that future acquisitions of 
communication equipment be IP-network capable. As stated in the BLOS C2 overview in 
Chapter III, BLOS C2 promotes bi-directional data exchanges of different types (FMV, 
still imagery, SA data, and voice and text chat communications) through a specialized 
network architecture. Traditional radio frequencies are easily capable of supporting voice 
communications; however, higher bandwidth IP networks are required to pass larger data 
format types such as visual imagery, SA data, and chat communications. It is these high 
bandwidth data types that make the BLOS C2 capability advantageous in achieving 
mission objectives such as effective emergency response.  
Although the NPSBN initiative is successfully emphasizing the application of P25 
digital radios into the public safety community, this does not include the IP capability 
required to support the BLOS C2 net-centric capabilities. While the P25 radio standards 
ensure that public safety agencies are equipped with interoperable radio technology, 
instead of outdated equipment with limited availability of radio frequencies, it does not 
include the requirement to support wideband IP network connectivity. With that said, 
although P25 radios are interoperable, the utility is limited to voice communications. In 
order to tap into BLOS C2 hosted services and interface with software applications on 
compact PC devices, a network device with either a wireless or Ethernet interface is 
required to provide connectivity to the larger network. This enables both coordinating 
and ground-level response personnel the ability to subscribe and publish various types of 
information across the BLOS C2 network.  
With DHS ensuring that future acquisitions of communication equipment be IP-
network capable, public response personnel will be provided with the Internet 
connectivity required to access BLOS C2 and other network infrastructure. This thesis 
suggests going about this task in one of two ways. The first and most cost-effective 
option is through the procurement of P25 radios with IP capability (P25IP). These radios 
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combine industry standard IP-network technology and traditional digital radios to deliver 
a single solution that is capable of supporting multiple data exchange formats. This type 
of system would allow public service personnel the ability to connect devices directly to 
their radio units when in need of network accessibility. Not only does this all-in-one 
solution increase network reliability by minimizing the amount of potential points of 
failure on a network, it also minimizes the amount of equipment that personnel need to 
take with them when responding to an emergency. Additionally, top commercial 
communications vendors such as Harris, Cisco, and Raytheon offer variants of this radio 
system. The second option for providing Internet connectivity to personnel is through the 
acquisition of commercial cellular mobile broadband devices. These systems can come in 
both standalone “hotspot” forms, as well as built-in solutions that are integrated with 
portable PCs. This solution requires the purchase of an additional piece of 
communications equipment and data plans, resulting in higher costs. With the addition of 
this equipment, the most realistic method of issuing/installing these devices is by 
outfitting response vehicles with the technology rather than having personnel carry them. 
Under these circumstances, users would be required to connect to these vehicle-based 
devices over a wireless or wired Ethernet connection in order to upload or access data 
residing on the network. This circumstance can imply limited access and functionality, 
and also increases the amount of steps required to achieve network connectivity that can 
result in a weakened network signal. Although this option is not as convenient as the first, 
it is still a viable solution for providing network access to ground assets. All major 
cellular network providers offer variants of this solution as well, providing options for 
optimal cellular coverage.  
In order to accomplish either of these network-providing options, it is 
recommended that DHS emphasize the importance of IP-compatible systems in order to 
drive the future procurement of capable communications equipment. One way that this 
can be approached is through the promotion of network data exchange capabilities such 
as BLOS C2. Through the identification of capability gaps that exist in current 
emergency response strategy, BLOS C2 could potentially provide solutions that create 
incentives for the procurement of IP-capable communications technology. More 
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importantly, this recommendation is essential to providing the fundamental network 
connectivity needed to access the BLOS C2 services and applications covered in the next 
section.  
B. RECOMMENDATION #2—CREATE A DHS-SPONSORED, 
NATIONWIDE, STANDARDIZED SOFTWARE SUITE TO UTILIZE 
BLOS C2 NETWORK CAPABILITIES  
The second recommendation for DHS to consider is a nationwide, standardized 
software suite for emergency responders. Once the NPSBN infrastructure is deployed and 
agencies have transitioned toward P25 digital IP-enabled radio equipment, emergency 
responders will have the interoperability means to access useful data being generated at 
multiple locations within an incident area. In order to utilize this data through the various 
BLOS C2 services, emergency responders must have a computer system with appropriate 
software applications to process and display the information. The BLOS C2 program 
addresses this with the software suite displayed in Figures 7 and 8, and the Special 
Operations community is equipped with battlefield air operations (BAO) kits to 
accomplish the same goal.83 Like the BLOS C2 software suite, the BAO kit applications 
allow the warfighter to send intelligence data from machine to machine through network 
properties. Fred Pushies, author of U.S. Air Force Special Ops, describes the importance 
of these applications by stating that, “while technology is a wonderful thing, it must be 
remembered that to be of any tactical value it must be placed in the hand of the battlefield 
airman.”84 This applies to the emergency responder as well. With vital sensor and SA 
data being generated during an emergency, it is important to package the information in a 
way that can reach the ground user directly in order to aid an effective and timely 
response.  
Like the Special Operations community, DHS would be well served by creating a 
standardized software suite that could be adopted nationwide by public service agencies 
in order to achieve optimal benefits from the BLOS C2 services. This software suite 
would run on compact machines such as laptops or tablet PCs as part of public safety-
                                                 
83 Fred Pushies (2000), U.S. Air Force Special Ops, St. Paul: Zenith Press, Print, 117.  
84 Ibid.  
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deployable equipment that could either be vehicle or personally mounted. In doing so, 
DHS should focus on the major use cases that would aid emergency response efforts the 
most. Once these use cases have been identified, market research of various software 
applications could be conducted to cater to the specific needs of the public service 
community. The major use cases that should be emphasized would be: 1) Situational 
Awareness (SA) development; 2) chat and voice communications; and 3) still imagery 
and Full Motion Video (FMV) distribution and viewing.  
One of the main benefits gained from the BLOS C2 capability is the enhanced SA 
picture derived from the various position and targeting technologies that are deployed 
with ground personnel. Providing a solution for this use case incorporates the generation, 
distribution, and display of the data within a COP for users at the coordinative and 
ground levels. Enterprise data sources such as emergency dispatch records could 
contribute to the improved environmental awareness of an incident area assuming a 
network connection is made to the database. In addition to the utilization of enterprise SA 
data, information being generated at the local level needs to be accessible to network 
users. Examples of local SA data are precise position and location information (PPLI) 
and sensor points of interest (SPoI). These two data sources aid in the control of assets 
and personnel, while also allowing users the ability to create spot reports on a map of 
locations that may require special attention. The software applications needed to support 
these capabilities should address mapping, targeting, tracking, and message translating. 
The Department of Defense (DoD) and Special Operations community rely on Cursor on 
Target (CoT) software to perform most of these tasks; however, DHS may discover other 
commercial products by way of market research.  
Another benefit to the BLOS C2 capability is the ability to participate in voice 
and text communications through a computer. This use case requires the ability to take 
part in chat room/group discussions while maintaining audio communications as well. 
Text chatting introduces the ability to focus on specific users by creating focused chat 
rooms, while maintaining the history of conversations for after-action review or general 
reference during a disaster. Additionally, it is possible to carry out voice communications 
over an Internet network through a method known as Voice over Internet Protocol 
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(VoIP). VoIP is the process of taking analog audio signals and converting them into 
digital data, making it possible to transmit them over the Internet. Like a text chat room, 
the VoIP method allows administrators the ability to create broad and/or focused groups 
to participate in, acting like a traditional channel on a radio frequency. With a capable 
radio providing IP-network connectivity, VoIP allows the operator to maintain traditional 
voice communications while using the same link to pass other forms of useful data such 
as SA data and FMV. The software applications needed to support these capabilities 
should address peer-to-peer chatting (in order to avoid a host server) and VoIP call 
management. There are a variety of proprietary and open source clients on the market 
that can perform both of these tasks.  
Lastly, still imagery and FMV generation and distribution is a use case that could 
be utilized by the BLOS C2 capability. In order to address this use case, software must be 
capable of viewing, storing, and sending both still images and real-time FMV. Visual aids 
offer a perspective that is irreplaceable when attempting to provide personnel with 
information that is difficult to explain with words. Still imagery can accomplish this 
while taking up only a moderate amount of network bandwidth. With more network 
availability and a live-streaming video source, FMV can offer accurate representation of 
environmental conditions to public safety personnel through the process of multicasting 
described in Chapter III. With the use of cameras in existing response practices, the 
ability to package and send visual data to network participants could offer substantial 
benefits. With the proper software, public service personnel participating in the BLOS C2 
network could share and display mission-critical still imagery and FMV in order to 
effectively gauge response tactics. The software applications needed to support these 
capabilities should address still imagery and FMV: viewing, annotation, multicasting, and 
distribution. Storage and management of this data can be conducted by BLOS C2 
services and standard Windows applications, along with popular open source video-
playing software, can handle most of the other tasks listed as well.  
With the development of a standardized software suite sponsored by DHS, public 
safety agencies can be prepared to actively participate in emergency response efforts that 
offer BLOS C2 network capabilities. The ability to implement the software suite on a 
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national level will largely rely on the effectiveness and accessibility of the product. 
Agencies must have a good reason to put the effort into learning the new software, as 
well as have an easy method of accessing the applications. With the proper research and 
organization of this recommended course of action, DHS could improve existing disaster 
response and recovery tactics.  
C. RECOMMENDATION #3—INTEGRATE EXISTING DHS COP 
EFFORTS WITH OTHER FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL COP 
INITIATIVES  
The implementation of the second recommendation offers a method for BLOS C2 
users to actively engage in a COP. As described in Chapter III, a COP provides users 
with a mutual perspective of an incident area by tying in all of the available data 
resources that have an established connection to the shared network. The result is a useful 
tool that complements traditional voice communications. Although the COP is intended 
to be “common,” as suggested in its name, agencies across DHS, such as the USCG, have 
developed standalone COPs that do not promote integration across the department as a 
whole. This issue presents inefficiencies in attempting to provide an interoperable 
solution for emergency response and recovery command and control. With that said, 
although the addition of a BLOS C2 COP could improve response strategies, it is 
recommended that DHS integrate existing agency COP efforts with other federal, state, 
and local COP initiatives. This recommendation would not only improve interagency 
information sharing, a major takeaway from the 9/11 Commission Report, it would also 
expand on the amount of information available that could support various public safety 
missions.  
In an effort to create synergies among its 22 agencies, DHS Chief Information 
Officer Richard Spires publicly expressed the desire to integrate various department 
programs including COPs.85 Agencies under DHS that have relied on COP technology 
include the USCG, FEMA, National Protection and Programs Directorate, and Customs 
and Border Protection (CBP), to name a few. With more than 20 COPs spread across 
                                                 
85 Alice Lipowicz, “DHS agencies starting to integrate missions, CIO says,” FCW (May 11, 2012): 
http://fcw.com/articles/2012/05/11/dhs-integration.aspx (accessed Aug. 15, 2013). 
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DHS, Spires said, “We all have COPs, but no real integration.”86 COP technology is 
currently being utilized in FEMAs main emergency operations center, displaying 
information such as weather conditions, positioning of FEMA personnel and assets, main 
transportation routes, and areas of damaged structures or roads and location of shelters on 
a map display.87 The technology also provides CBP with border security information, and 
the USCG with maritime conditions to assist in carrying out mission objectives. DHS has 
realized that the integration of the various COPs across the department could offer shared 
benefits in carrying out national security; already, DHS has started to merge these efforts 
by integrating some of the 117 identity-screening programs that are used across the 
department.88 Although this is a positive move toward department-wide integration, it is 
recommended that efforts be made to extend the collaboration with other federal, state, 
and local agencies that either already have, or can benefit from COP initiatives.  
In order to share COP-relevant information across various agencies at all levels of 
government, a standardized format for different types of data must be created and 
mandated to create seamless data exchanges. This would aid in the integration of existing 
DHS COP initiatives with similar mapping efforts, as suggested earlier. Contributing to 
the accomplishment of this task is the Global Justice XML Data Model (GJXDM), first 
introduced in 2003. This effort sought to solve challenges involving information sharing 
through the creation of well-defined data elements that would provide a model for data 
interoperability.89 In 2005, this effort became known as the National Information 
Exchange Model (NIEM), and was initiated by DHS and the U.S. Department of Justice 
(DOJ), successfully uniting major stakeholders from all levels of government toward a 
common model for information sharing.90 The NIEM website states that, “all 50 states as 
                                                 
86 Alice Lipowicz, “DHS agencies starting to integrate missions, CIO says,” FCW (May 11, 2012): 
http://fcw.com/articles/2012/05/11/dhs-integration.aspx (accessed Aug. 15, 2013). 
87 Ibid.  
88 Ibid.  
89 Van Hitch, “History of the National Information Exchange Model,” NIEM website: 
https://www.niem.gov/aboutniem/Pages/history.aspx (accessed Aug. 17, 2013).  
90 Ibid.  
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well as 19 federal agencies are committed to using NIEM at varying levels of maturity,” 
which provides the user-base and platform for integrating COP data.91  
With the evolving development and use of NIEM, a medium has been provided to 
guide COP integration across federal, state, and local agencies. However, unless 
organizations are mandated to comply with the NIEM data-sharing model, 
interoperability gaps will continue to exist within the public service community. Without 
this step being taken, relevant data will be prevented from being accessed by partnering 
agencies that may find the information useful in carrying out critical mission objectives. 
This includes the vast amount of COP data that is exclusively available to individual 
agencies. For this reason, my findings in this thesis suggest that DHS mandate the 
compliance of the NIEM data-sharing model for public service agencies at all levels of 
government. Once this is accomplished, existing DHS COP efforts could more easily 
integrate with other federal, state, and local COP initiatives, as well as a BLOS C2 COP. 
                                                 
91 Van Hitch, “History of the National Information Exchange Model,” NIEM website: 
https://www.niem.gov/aboutniem/Pages/history.aspx (accessed Aug. 17, 2013).  
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V. FUTURE RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS AND 
CONCLUSION 
A. FUTURE RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS 
The findings of this thesis highlight some useful directions for future research. 
Based on the ongoing efforts conducted by DHS to implement the NPSBN and improve 
interoperability, as well as the recommendations made in the previous chapter, the 
following topics are recommended for future research: 
 The continued evolution of the NPSBN. 
 Evaluation of the government-wide implementation of the NPSBN. 
 The adaptability of NGEN P25 radios by the public safety community.  
 The continued DHS efforts to integrate department and other government 
COP efforts.  
 DHS’ prioritization of emphasizing IP-capable communications 
equipment to support the exchange of multiple data formats. 
 A DHS-sponsored creation of a standardized software suite aimed at 
improving COP interaction and data exchanges.  
These research topics address implementations that could improve disaster 
response and recovery aside from BLOS C2 specific involvement. BLOS C2 could 
address some of these topics; however, the topics listed above provide the best platforms 
for further research due to content availability. 
B. CONCLUSION 
This thesis introduced the BLOS C2 capability as a method of improving disaster 
response and recovery by enhancing situational awareness (SA) as well as command and 
control (C2). Inspired by historical shortcomings that resulted in the devastating loss of 
American lives, the BLOS C2 capability promotes seamless communication and data 
sharing by means of sensor data and a truly common operational picture (COP). This 
capability has proven to be a useful resource for the U.S. military on the battlefield, 
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utilizing various ISR sensor data to improve battlespace coordination and fulfill critical 
military objectives. The ability to improve SA and C2 is a valuable capability for our 
nation’s domestic missions as well, especially in disaster scenarios that threaten 
homeland security. Using the proven model that has improved mission effectiveness for 
the U.S. military, this thesis used the Department of Homeland Security and other levels 
of government involved in emergency response as case studies for analyzing the BLOS 
C2 capability in an effort to fill gaps in interoperability and information sharing. 
Fortunately, at the federal level, DHS has been focusing on addressing these very 
capability gaps ever since the release of the 9/11 Commission Report, and increasingly so 
after Hurricane Katrina. Feeding off of DHS’ existing efforts, this thesis developed a 
series of case studies to analyze and assess DHS interoperability and information-sharing 
efforts at the federal, state, and local levels of government. The USCG, CAL FIRE, and 
SPD were used to conclude whether or not the BLOS C2 capability could improve 
disaster response and recovery efforts. In each circumstance, the implementation of 
BLOS C2 capabilities displayed a potential to improve general mission fulfillment as 
well as emergency response tactics in particular. While these agencies displayed varying 
degrees of interoperability and information-sharing abilities, this thesis drew on all of the 
case study assessments to provide recommendations aimed at assisting the 
implementation of the BLOS C2 capability. These recommendations were made to assist 
DHS in closing interoperability and information-sharing gaps, and ultimately improving 
disaster response and recovery efforts.  
In the process of determining where the most improvements needed to be made 
across the various levels of government, this thesis revealed that DHS has addressed most 
of the major problem areas through the Nationwide Public Service Broadband Network 
(NPSBN) initiative. Focused on providing a dedicated section of radio spectrum for 
public safety use, the NPSBN is actively establishing an interoperable communications 
infrastructure in order to ensure network availability during emergency situations. The 
current developmental phase of the NPSBN presents a unique opportunity to introduce 
technologies that could further contribute to and benefit from the initiative such as BLOS 
C2. With the evolution of this public safety network, solutions for managing and 
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producing network content become increasingly relevant. The integrative Common 
Operating Picture (COP) technology that the BLOS C2 introduces, along with the ability 
to send and view useful sensor data residing on a network, make BLOS C2 a valuable 
asset in improving response efforts at the coordinative and ground level.  
In continuing the effort to promote interoperability and information sharing across 
the various public service agencies, DHS will face challenges in ensuring that 
communication standards are carried out nationwide. In order to cover all aspects of 
network interoperability, DHS must take into consideration the services, capabilities, and 
applications that will reside on NPSBN. By considering the recommendations laid out in 
the previous chapter of this thesis, and implementing the BLOS C2 capability, DHS can 
provide the public service community with network content that could enhance SA and 
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